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The use of the injunction as a panacea for legal ills has led
to an attempt to make it practically a substitute for quo warranto
proceedings against private corporations illegally organized.
The fact that a trust was involved made the attempt more plau-
sible in Stockton v. American Tobacco Co., 36 Atlantic (N. J. Eq.)
971. When companies which manufactured ninety-five per cent
of the cigarettes of the United States were incorporated into the
American Tobacco Co., they issued its stock in exchange for the
property of the several manufactories thus merged. Little
money was actually paid in. It then set out to keep other manu-
facturers from getting a foothold in the market by making job-
bers sign a contract not to sell the cigarettes of any other com-
pany, and its own only at a certain high price. The jobbers,
deprived of the profit from selling other goods, then asked that
the trust be restrained from causing this special injury, and also
moved the Attorney-General to ask for an injunction restraining
the alleged public injury. The court expressed no doubts that
the acts were within the chartered powers of the corporation.
Being a legal entity, "a trading corporation has the same
authority as an individual to sell or consign its goods, to select
its selling agents, and to impose conditions as to whom they
shall sell, and the terms upon which they shall sell." Then
quoting from Chancellor Vroom, in the leading case of Attor-
ney-General v. Stevens, i N. J. Eq. 369, the decision proceeds:
"They are a corporation de facto, if not dejure. * * * I do
not feel at liberty in this incidental way to declare all their pro-
ceedings void, and treat them as a body having no rights and
powers." The purpose of the contract to form the corporation
may have been to create a monopoly. As such it was unenforce-
able, and might have been annulled upon a bill filed by the
Attorney-General. But to enjoin it from exercising its powers
would be equivalent to taking away its powers. For this there
is an adequate remedy at law, by quo warranto. To enjoin the
-agents of the corporation from doing acts within its powers is
practically to enjoin the corporation from transacting any busi-
ness, and this is the equivalent of a judgment on quo warranto.
Although such a prayer will not be granted in the case of private
corporations it is well settled that where a quasi-public corpora-
tion exceeds its corporate powers and its acts tend to public
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injury a bill will lie to restrain it. Such are the cases of Raritan
and D. B. R. Co. v. Del. and R. Canal, 18 N. J. Eq. 547, and
Atty. Gen. v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., ii Cho. Div. 450.
A few years ago to break up the coal "trust" a bill was rec-
ognized to annul the lease of the New Jersey Central to the
Philadelphia and Reading (Stockton v. Ry. Co., 5o N. J. Eq. 52;
24 Atlantic 964). But in that case the lease was distinctly ultra
vires, and its annulment in no way curtailed any corporate pow-
ers. It is interesting to note in this connection that in New
York the officers and agents of the American Tobacco Co. have
been indicted for conspiracy in doing acts in furtherance of the
contract tendered to its agents and referred to above. The acts
were held to amount to "intimidation," and therefore were un-
lawful, and a combination of the officers of the corporation to
carry them out amounted to conspiracy (People v. Duke, 44 N.
Y. Sup. 336).
The Supreme Court of Missouri in the recent case of Glencoe
Sand and Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Commission Co. (40 S. W.
Rep. 93), has decided that no action will lie against one who
induces a third party to break a contract with another, unless
the relation of master and servant was created by such contract.
In reaching this conclusion the court has departed from the Eng-
lish doctrine as laid down in Lumley v. Guy (2 El. & B. 216),
and Bowen v. Hall (62 B. Div. 333), and from Walker v. Cronin
(107 Mass. 555), Haskins v. Royster (70 N. C. 6oz), Jones v. Stan-
ley (76 N. C. 355), and Jones v. Blocker (43 Ga. 33), the early
decisions of this country following the English decisions.
Lumley v. Guy, supra, decided in 1853, was the first English
case to extend the doctrine and hold that an action would lie for
the procurement of a breach of contract even though the strict
relation of master and servant did not exist. Bowen v. Hall,
supra, followed and affirmed this in 1881. Walker v. Cronin,
supra, and cases following it, held that the action did not rest
upon the relation of master and servant alone, but was founded
upon the legal right derived from the contract, and that it applied
to all contracts of employment if not to contracts of every de-
scription. The later American decisions, which are relied upon
by the court in the present case, hold directly the reverse. In
Chambers v. Baldwin (9 1 Ky. 122) and Bourlier v. Macauley (id.
135) decided in i89i, it is held that there are only two exceptions
to the rule that an action cannot be maintained against one who
maliciously procures the breach of a contract, viz:
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(i). Whereby a contract of employment the relation of master
and servant exists, and (2), where the party has been procured
to make the breach against his will by deception and coercion
Boyson v. Thorn (98 Cal. 579), decided in 1893, holds that the
action will not lie unless the relation of master and servant ex-
ists, or there were threats, violence falsehood, deception, etc.,
used in procuring the branch.
In the present case which was an action brought for procur-
ing a railway company to break a contract of carriage with the
plaintiff, the learned judge thought it not pertinent to inquire
whether the relation of master and servant existed between the
plaintiff and the railroad for "to hold that a carrier is the servant
or employe of the shipper would revolutionize the whole law
relating to the duties, obligations, and liabilities of common car-
riers."
When a doctrine which has been almost continuously upheld
since the foundation of the common law, is overturned, it is
worthy of notice. Such a case is that of Clayton v. Clark et al,
21 South. Rep. 565, which was founded upon a few simple facts.
A written agreement of release had been given, upon receipt of
$i,ooo, for a past-due note of $2,789. Upon an attempt to re-
cover the balance, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in a very
clear and logical opinion, containing a resumi since its foundation
of the doctrine involved, reversed the rule almost continually
held hitherto, that "an agreement by a creditor with his debtor
to accept a smaller sum of money in satisfaction of an ascer-
tained debt of a greater sum is without consideration and is not
binding upon the creditor, even though he has received the
smaller sum agreed upon in the new contract." The court also
overruled the cases of Jones v. Perkins, 29 Miss. 139, and Jones v.
Perkins, 50 Miss. 251, in setting up this new rule as the doctrine
of the State of Mississippi.
A Connecticut case of special importance is that of Canastota
Knife Co. v. Newington Tramway Co., lately decided by the
Supreme Court of that State. This case involved the interesting
question of "additional servitude," and while the court agreed in
its conclusions, there were two views raised as to whether a
street railway may be built in a highway without compensation
to the owners of the adjoining land. The majority of the court
hold that circumstances may determine that point, while two
dissenting judges are of the opinion that the owner is entitled to
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compensation. Judge Baldwin, in the majority opinion, main-
tains that the common law of Connecticut is somewhat more
favorable to the rights of the public as against the land owner
than the common law of England, and that New York is the
only State in the country which has accepted the position that a
railway not operated by steam imposes new servitude upon the
soil of a city or village street. While the courts of Connecticut
have regarded the railway structure as the private property of
the company and in the nature of real estate, they also hold that
its right to pass over the streets is no greater than that of any
other member of the community, at the most a limited, qualified
property right; and no owner of the soil, subject to the highway,
had set up a claim to compensation for the construction of a
street railway upon it, before the present suit was brought. The
majority of the court hold that there is no substantial impedi-
ment to public travel or proximate cause of special damage of a
new description to the owner of the soil, and that the public
right has for some time been recognized as extending not only
to the laying of water pipes, gas pipes, etc., but to street railways
as well. "Two rights are to be guarded with equal care; that of
the individual land owner, and that of the public at large; but
his estate is the servient tenement. He has no rights which are
incompatible with the fullest enjoyment of the public easement."
The dissenting judges, however, regard the street railway as
creating a new right against the owner of the fee in favor of
persons with whom he before had no legal relation whatever,
and as burdening the land with a peculiar use for one person ex-
clusive of any rights in others to that use.
